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WE  THE  PEOPLE:  JURIES,  NOT  JUDGES,  SHOULD
BE  THE  GATEKEEPERS  OF  EXPERT  EVIDENCE
Krista M. Pikus*
“I believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people,




On August 18, 2007, Matthew Valente became paralyzed below the waist
with partial paralysis to his upper body from a golf cart accident.2  At the
time of the accident, Valente was eighteen years old and working as a cart
and range attendant at La Tourette Golf Course on Staten Island.3  Valente’s
work responsibilities included driving and transporting golf carts.  La Tou-
rette properly trained Valente on how to operate the golf carts.  On the day
of the accident, Matthew was driving an E–Z–Go golf cart manufactured by
Textron.4  The golf carts did not have seatbelts or four-wheel brakes.5
Valente was driving on the cart path when his hat blew off.6  He applied the
brakes, turned the wheel slightly, and the golf cart fishtailed, rolling over
onto its passenger side, leaving Valente with a spinal fracture and paralyzed.7
Valente and his father brought a products liability suit against the manu-
facturer of the golf cart.8  Despite his efforts, Valente’s case never made it to
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.S. in Business, Miami University,
2012; B.A. in Psychology, Miami University, 2012.  This Note is dedicated to my parents for
being expert caregivers all my life.  I am grateful to my family, friends, and the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their support and encouragement in preparing this Note.
1 James Madison Replies to Patrick Henry, Defending the Taxing Power and Explain-
ing Federalism, June 6, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 611, 612
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter James Madison Replies].
2 Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 429.
6 Id. at 414.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 413.
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a jury.9  Nevertheless, Valente had his “day in court” when the judge con-
ducted a hearing on the reliability of his expert evidence.10  But that “day in
court” consisted of findings made solely by a judge, not by a jury.11
The Framers of our Constitution considered the right to a trial by jury to
be more than just a fundamental right—it was an essential safeguard against
tyranny.12  Thomas Jefferson said he considered trial by jury “the only anchor
ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the princi-
ples of its constitution.”13  This right acted as a balance of power between the
people and their government.14  Approximately two hundred years later,
Chief Justice Rehnquist proclaimed, “[t]he founders of our Nation consid-
ered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyr-
anny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the
sovereign.”15  Indeed, the U.S. Constitution does not contain a “sovereignty”
clause.16  Rather, the first words in the Preamble of the Constitution are: “We
the People.”17
At the time of the founding, Americans considered jury service as a form
of political power.18  This form of political power has dramatically plum-
meted since then.19  In 1962, trials resolved approximately twelve percent of
federal civil cases.20  In 2002, that number had dropped to less than two per-
cent.21  One factor contributing to this significant decrease in trials is the
increasing popularity of alternative dispute resolutions.22  For those who
choose to go to trial, the chance of actually getting the case before a jury is
still very rare due to various procedural obstacles.23  In addition to these pro-
cedural obstacles, there is an increasing trend in the law of taking decision-
9 Id. at 440 (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment after a Daubert hear-
ing excluded testimony of plaintiff’s experts).
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 875–77 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2013)
(discussing the history and purpose of the right to a trial by jury).
13 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 1789, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
14 See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1084–87
(Ohio 1999) (discussing the right to a jury trial as an aspect of the separation of powers
doctrine).
15 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16 See U.S. CONST.
17 Id. pmbl.
18 See generally MICHAEL SINGER, JURY DUTY: RECLAIMING YOUR POLITICAL POWER AND
TAKING RESPONSIBILITY 73–108 (2012) (discussing the jury as a political institution).
19 See Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 2.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A Problem in Need of Solution?, 79 CONN. B.J.
1, 14–23 (2005).
23 See id. at 18–21.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 3  8-DEC-14 14:57
2014] we  the  people 455
making power away from the jury and placing it into the hands of the
judge.24
The implication of reduced jury authority is evident in the recent case,
Valente v. Textron, Inc.,25 discussed above.  The judge granted summary judg-
ment for the defense after he excluded Valente’s expert evidence following a
Daubert26 hearing on the reliability of the methods the expert used in arriv-
ing at his conclusions.27  Since Daubert and its progeny reformed the stan-
dards on expert evidence,28 every case involving an expert witness requires
the judge to adjudicate the reliability of the expert’s methods.29  The Daubert
hearing in Valente v. Textron, Inc. was thus not before a jury, but only the
judge.30  Valente appealed his case to the Second Circuit asserting that the
judge abused his discretion in excluding the expert evidence.31  The Second
Circuit held that the judge’s thoughtful and thorough explanation for
excluding the evidence demonstrated that he acted within his discretion.32
The judge should not have this discretion in the first place.  Rather, a
jury should decide the reliability of the expert’s testimony.33  While the judge
may determine if the proponent of the expert testimony laid enough founda-
tion to establish the witness’s qualifications as an expert since it presents
questions of law,34 the jury should determine the reliability of the methods
the expert used since it primarily entails questions of fact.35
24 See Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flowing In, but the Jury Pool Is Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/us/30bar.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (recog-
nizing arguments from legal scholars that summary judgment violates the Seventh Amend-
ment because it takes the jury’s power to decide and gives it to the judge).
25 931 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
26 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that
judges should act as a gatekeeper in regard to the reliability of expert evidence).
27 Valente, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
28 See Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in Admitting
Scientific Evidence, 83 JUDICATURE 140, 142 (1999).
29 See David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 27 (2013) (noting that “by 2000 all expert testimony needed to
pass a reliability test before it could be deemed admissible”).  If the opponent of the expert
evidence fails to object on Daubert grounds and requests a ruling on that evidence in a
timely manner, the opponent may waive his right to object. See, e.g., Macsenti v. Becker,
237 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2001); Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277,
1289–90 (10th Cir. 2000).
30 See Valente, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 413.
31 Valente v. Textron, Inc., 559 F. App’x 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2014).
32 Id. at 14.
33 See infra Section IV.A.
34 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified . . . .”); see also Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 459 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“Whether [the witness] is qualified to testify as an expert is a question of law.”
(citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a))).
35 Compare Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 183 (1895) (“[Defendants have a] right
to have the jury decide every matter of fact involved in that issue.” (emphasis added)), with
43 WILLIAM C. FLANAGAN & HARRY P. CARROLL, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES: TRIAL
PRACTICE § 17.17 (2d ed. 2013) (“In order to qualify, a witness as an expert the proponent
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This Note urges restoration of the proper balance of power36 between
judges and juries regarding expert evidence.  Our justice system has steadily
moved away from letting juries decide important questions of fact and toward
putting the decisionmaking power into the hands of judges.37  The recent
developments in evidence law, requiring judges to act as the “gatekeepers” of
expert evidence, present significant obstacles for plaintiffs attempting to get
cases to a jury.38  This newer standard in expert evidence is a violation of the
foundational precept in American jurisprudence that the people should be
the sovereign, not the judge.39
Part I discusses the history and development of jurisprudence regarding
jury decisionmaking.  Part II discusses the development of jurisprudence
regarding expert evidence.  Part III discusses the current status and empirical
implications of the expert evidence standards.  Specifically, it seeks to show
the jurisprudential flaws in the Daubert trilogy, which takes fact-finding away
from a jury and allows for more judicial activism by policy-driven judges.
Finally, Part IV proposes solutions to resolve the flaws of today’s expert evi-
dence standard by returning to juries their proper fact-finding authority and
limiting judicial discretion.  Practical and theoretical implications are
discussed.
I. HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF JURY DECISIONMAKING IN AMERICA
One of the central tenets in American jurisprudence is the right to a
trial by jury.40  This right to be tried by the people became a symbol of the
overthrown power of the king.41  The Framers saw this right as such a critical
of the testimony must, as a preliminary question of fact, meet five separate criteria to the
satisfaction of the judge.” (emphasis added)), and 3B JAY E. GRENIG & DANIEL D. BLINKA,
WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK § 907.02:25 (2014) (“[Wis-
consin law on expert evidence] requires a range of findings that mixes questions of fact and
law.” (emphasis added)).
36 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598–601 (1993) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning that the Daubert command for
judges to act as gatekeepers may result in judges overextending their judicial power).
37 See AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION
REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 92 (1998) (arguing that the jury is empowered to do
much more than answer questions of fact, but that much of that power has been usurped
by the judge); Liptak, supra note 24 (recognizing arguments from legal scholars that sum-
mary judgment violates the Seventh Amendment because it takes the jury’s power to
decide and gives it to the judge).
38 See Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65, 78 (2006) (“Daubert and
cases following it have adjusted the substantive rules of tort by creating extra obstacles to
plaintiffs trying to prove their claims.”).
39 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 126 (“Under our Constitution, sovereignty
belongs to the People, not to the government—be it state or federal. . . . [T]he jury plays a
leading role in preserving that sovereignty.”).
40 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153–57 (1968) (discussing the right to a trial
by jury as a fundamental right).
41 See id. at 152–54 (noting that the right to a trial by jury originated as a check on
arbitrary treatment from the Crown); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
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aspect of ensuring equality and justice that it appears multiple times in the
Bill of Rights.  The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury.”42  The Sixth Amendment similarly states that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.”43  Additionally, the Seventh Amendment pro-
claims, “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”44
A. Development of the Right to Serve on a Jury
Even though the right to a jury trial is a critical and fundamental right,
the right to serve on a jury was not extended to all on an equal basis until
recently.  In 1879, the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia45 held that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the
right of a trial by jury46 and that service on a jury cannot be limited by race.47
In that same year, the Supreme Court decided Virginia v. Rives,48 holding
that the right to be considered for jury service was distinct from the right to
serve on a jury.  Accordingly, blacks and minorities were frequently excluded
from consideration for jury service.  Such discrimination continued until the
civil rights movement when more explicit steps were taken to eliminate such
discrimination.49  In 1986, the Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentucky50
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from challenging poten-
tial jurors solely on account of their race.51  In 1994, the Supreme Court
extended the Batson rule to gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.52
Women faced similar struggles in attempting to gain an equal right to
serve on a jury.  Women could not serve on juries on equal terms as men
until the mid-1970s.53  After such efforts to secure equal rights regarding jury
service, one would expect that such a right would be treasured and greatly
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1780, at 559 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, &
Co., 5th ed. 1891) (1833) (“The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to guard
against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a spirit of
violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people.”).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
43 Id. amend. VI (emphasis added).
44 Id. amend. VII (emphasis added).
45 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
46 Id. at 312.
47 Id. at 307–08.
48 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
49 See generally Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (deciding
that an action by a state that arbitrarily deprives a person of the opportunity to serve on a
jury is a violation of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution).
50 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51 Id. at 80.
52 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
53 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that women cannot be system-
atically excluded from jury panels from which petit juries are drawn).
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appreciated today.  However, the opposite has occurred.  Courts have given
to judges much of the decisionmaking power originally held by juries.54  The
importance of the right to a trial by jury and allowing the people to act as the
fact-finder, however, remains a critical safeguard of the foundational
precepts of our Constitution.
B. Jurisprudential Theories of Jury Decisionmaking
Our system of government is based on the idea that the people are sover-
eign.55  The idea of popular sovereignty is demonstrated by the structure of
our Constitution in Articles I and II, which provide that the people elect
representatives for the legislature56 and elect a President.57  The President
then nominates individuals for the Supreme Court that must be confirmed
by the Senate.58  Jury service is another mechanism of popular sovereignty, as
people sit on juries.59  The right to a trial by jury of one’s peers is an integral
part of our legal system.60
The basis of jury decisionmaking in American jurisprudence is that
juries provide a strong check against governmental oppression.61  One of the
primary structural principles of our Constitution that prevents government
oppression is the separation of powers.62  James Madison wrote in the Feder-
alist Papers that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very def-
54 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 92 (arguing that juries are empowered to do
much more than answer questions of fact, but much of that power has been usurped by the
judge); see also Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries—Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury
Verdicts, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 237, 345 (observing that judges now also have the power to
reduce jury verdicts).
55 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 7 (noting that one of the first principles of
American jurisprudence is that the people are sovereign); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING
THE PEOPLE 235–88 (1988) (discussing the concept of popular sovereignty in American
jurisprudence); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1910
(2008) (same); Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 282–84 (1992) (discussing the history and exercise of
popular sovereignty in America).
56 U.S. CONST. art. I.
57 Id. art. II, § 1.
58 Id. § 2.
59 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 58 (discussing the political power in jury ser-
vice and how it acts as a mechanism of popular sovereignty).
60 See generally SINGER, supra note 18.
61 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at xiv–xv (noting that juries act as a check on
governmental power); Paul Butler, Op-Ed., Jurors Need to Know That They Can Say No, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/jurors-can-say-no
.html?_r=0 (noting that Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia mentioned at a Senate hear-
ing that juries could ignore the law and provide a strong check on governmental power).
62 See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 337–38 (2d ed.
1998) (discussing Madison’s view on the importance of separation of powers).
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inition of tyranny.”63  Safeguards are put in place so that each branch acts as
a check and balance on the other branches.64  The power of judicial review
implied in Article III of the Constitution65 is one example of the principle of
checks and balances.66
Some have argued that judicial review is at odds with our commitment to
democracy.  This is commonly called the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”67
Alexander Bickel used that term to refer to the concern with unelected
judges invalidating laws that reflect the will of the majority,68 thus undermin-
ing principles of democracy.69  However, some scholars perceive judicial
review as a necessary check on other branches of government.70
How judges are kept in check is unclear.71  Judges possess a significant
amount of power with uncertain rules for exercising that power.72  Allowing
the jury to make more decisions, instead of the judge, acts as a check on the
judge’s power.73
Furthermore, on appellate review, the court reviews questions of law de
novo and questions of fact for clear error.74  The standard for overturning
questions of fact is higher than for overturning questions of law.75  This
higher standard for overturning questions primarily decided by juries acts as
a check on judges’ power to overturn the decision of the people.
63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
64 See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
278–79 (rev. ed. 1992) (discussing the effectiveness of checks and balances); Jim Powell,
James Madison: Checks and Balances to Limit Government Power, THE FREEMAN (Mar. 1, 1996)
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/james-madison-checks-and-balances-to-limit-gov
ernment-power (discussing safeguards put in place to limit government power and ensure
balance of powers).
65 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (recognizing the implied
power of judicial review to invalidate unconstitutional laws).
66 See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 628 (1993)
(“Judicial review can be and is used to check the actions of wayward majorities.”).
67 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
68 Id. at 16–23.
69 See id. But see Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 333, 362–66 (2012) (discussing a second countermajoritarian difficulty when
Justices strike down statutes that are supported by the majority according to public opinion
polls).
70 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 66, at 627–28 (discussing how judicial review operates
as a check on the other branches of government).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See Butler, supra note 61 (“Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia, asked at a Senate
hearing about the role of juries in checking governmental power, seemed open to the
notion that jurors ‘can ignore the law’ if the law ‘is producing a terrible result.’”).
74 See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (“For purposes of standard
of review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated
questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), and
matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).”).
75 Id. at 557–63.
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When juries make decisions, instead of judges, it reaffirms the idea that
the power properly lies with the people.76  On the other hand, when judges
have a vast majority of the decisionmaking power, the judge is the “sover-
eign” instead of the people.  Instead, there should be a balance of decision-
making power between judges and juries.  Recently, though, this power has
become unbalanced as the decisionmaking power is steadily being taken
away from juries and put into the hands of judges.
C. Taking the Decisionmaking Power Away from the Jury
Today, cases are rarely resolved by juries.77  Studies show that approxi-
mately eighty to ninety percent of civil lawsuits settle78 and ninety percent of
criminal cases are never heard by juries, but are instead determined by plea
bargains.79  Of those few cases that actually make it to trial, judges still decide
a significant majority of cases.80  This could be because the parties have
waived their right to a jury trial,81 or because there are no questions of fact
remaining.82
Our legal system has long accepted the concept of judges deciding ques-
tions of law while juries decide questions of fact.83  One of the primary pur-
poses of a jury is to prevent one person (the judge) from being a sovereign.
76 See James L. Wright & M. Matthew Williams, Remember The Alamo: The Seventh Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards,
45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 458–59 (2004) (noting that jury trials act as a check on state govern-
mental power); Butler, supra note 61.
77 See Refo, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that in 2002, less than two percent of federal
civil cases were disposed of by a jury trial).
78 Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better Than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html.
79 See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system
.html?_r=0 (“[R]ights [contained in the Bill of Rights] are, for the overwhelming majority
of people hauled into courtrooms across America, theoretical.  More than 90 percent of
criminal cases are never tried before a jury.  Most people charged with crimes forfeit their
constitutional rights and plead guilty.”).
80 See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 71 (2011)
(noting that “judges decide the overwhelming majority of cases in our nation”).
81 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)(1) (noting that a criminal trial must be by jury unless the
defendant waives this right in writing); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a jury trial
unless its demand is properly served and filed.  A proper demand may be withdrawn only if
the parties consent.”).
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”).
83 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 183 (1895) (Gray & Shiras, JJ., dissenting)
(noting that defendants have a “right to have the jury decide every matter of fact involved
in that issue” (emphasis added)).
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Instead, the people are sovereign.84  Giving questions of fact to juries and
questions of law to judges balances the power between them.85
Cases that would typically be in the purview of jury decisionmaking, such
as consumer contract disputes, are frequently resolved by arbitration due to
mandatory clauses in agreements that consumers likely did not read before
agreeing to them.86  Cases otherwise qualifying for trial are often dismissed
due to preliminary evidentiary determinations made solely by the judge,87
even when such determinations primarily entail questions of fact.88  Specifi-
cally, the change in standards governing expert evidence over the past two
decades has significantly decreased the number of cases that are actually
decided by juries.89  Judges deciding questions of fact regarding expert evi-
dence disrupts the balance of power and infringes on juries’ already-declin-
ing authority.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE JURISPRUDENCE
For the past twenty years, courts have debated the standard governing
the introduction and evaluation of expert evidence.90  Generally, courts have
84 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 50–71 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing
who and what the sovereign is).
85 Compare Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 377, 401–02 (1999) (discussing the development of the fact-finding function
of the jury), with Sparf, 156 U.S. at 183 (Gray & Shiras, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that
defendants in a criminal case have the right to have juries decide every question of fact)
and AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 99–100 (positing that allowing juries to decide ques-
tions of law would usurp the powers of the court).
86 See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provi-
sions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 160 (2007) (noting that consumers rarely read or compre-
hend arbitration agreements).
87 See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment for the defense after the district court excluded expert evi-
dence after a Daubert hearing); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 581 (6th Cir. 2000)
(same); Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing a com-
plaint after excluding plaintiffs’ expert testimony); Dunn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 275 F.
Supp. 2d 672, 684 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (same); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Clean-
ing, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 614 (D.N.J. 2002) (excluding expert evidence following a Daubert
hearing).
88 See 3B GRENIG & BLINKA, supra note 35, § 907.02:25 (“[Wisconsin law on expert
evidence] requires a range of findings that mixes questions of fact and law, namely, the wit-
ness’s qualifications, the helpfulness of the testimony, whether the opinion is sufficiently
supported by facts and data, the reliability of the witness’s principles and methods, and
whether the witness applied them in a reliable manner.” (emphasis added)); cf. Sparf, 156
U.S. at 183 (Gray & Shiras, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that defendants have a “right to have a
jury decide every matter of fact involved in that issue” (emphasis added)).
89 See David M. Flores et al., Examining the Effects of the Daubert Trilogy on Expert Evidence
Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 533, 563 (2010) (noting
that Daubert led to more in limine challenges and less jury involvement in expert witness
admission processes).
90 See, e.g., Daniel E. Fisher, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Supreme
Court Gives Federal Judges the Keys to the Gate of Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 39 S.D.
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shifted the authority to assess expert testimony from juries to judges.91  What
was intended to give district courts more flexibility in managing their dock-
ets92 has resulted in giving judges more power to decide the ultimate issues
in the case.  This Section presents an overview of the evolution of standards
in expert evidence.
A. The Frye Standard
In many civil and criminal cases, parties call expert witnesses to testify
about a question of fact that requires specialized knowledge to evaluate the
evidence.93  Even if the proper foundation is laid to establish the expert’s
qualifications, opposing parties often object to the reliability of the methods
that the expert uses to support his conclusion.  Such an objection was made
in the case Frye v. United States,94 which started the revolution that changed
admissibility standards of expert testimony.
In 1923, James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of murder.95  Frye sought to
introduce evidence of a systolic blood pressure deception test.96  The systolic
blood pressure deception test acted as a lie detector test based on the theory
that lies require a conscious effort which will be reflected by a change in
blood pressure.97  The court denied admissibility of this test pursuant to the
government’s objection98 on the basis that it did not have scientific recogni-
tion among authorities in the field.99  The court held that “the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”100  Since the sys-
tolic blood pressure deception test had not yet gained such acceptance, the
court sustained the government’s objection to its admissibility.101
L. REV. 141 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
577 (1984); Peter B. Oh, The Proper Test for Assessing the Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert
Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437 (1997).
91 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding
that judges, rather than a jury, should act as a gatekeeper in regards to the reliability of
expert evidence).
92 See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 896–97 (2013) (“Daubert
thus began as a modest attempt to expand district courts’ management of their dockets.”).
93 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (listing the criteria required for expert testimony to be
admissible).
94 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95 Id. at 1013.
96 Id. at 1013–14.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1014.
99 Id.
100 Id. (emphasis added).
101 Id.
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This Frye general acceptance standard was the prevailing standard for
evaluating expert testimony in federal courts for several decades.102  This test
left the determination of reliability and validity of an expert’s methods to the
scientific community.103  Although the judge ultimately made the assessment
under Frye, the judge’s role was still limited since his decision was dependent
on the scientific community’s assessment of the methods.  Developments
after Frye changed this by having the judge assume a more active role.
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence (1975)
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.104  Rule 702,
which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, originally stated “[i]f sci-
entific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”105  The adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not specifically address whether the Frye gen-
eral acceptance standard still prevailed.106  Without explicit acknowledgment
of the validity of Frye in the federal rules, courts varied on its application.107
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence standard for expert testi-
mony was altered again in 1993 when the Supreme Court heard Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.108
C. The Daubert Trilogy
Standards for admissibility of expert testimony changed dramatically
when the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.109
The Supreme Court decided two other significant cases addressing expert
102 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (“In the 70 years
since its formulation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ test has been the dominant
standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.”).
103 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (holding the systolic blood pressure deception test invalid
because it had yet to gain “standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities”).
104 See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1123–24 n.103 (E.D. Ky.
1980) (“Congress enacted a statute adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence effective July 1,
1975.”); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
UAL 5 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence).  For fur-
ther discussion on the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Margaret A.
Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 255 (1984).
105 An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
106 See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (noting that “the assertion that the [Federal Rules
of Evidence] somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing”).
107 See Fisher, supra note 90, at 152.
108 509 U.S. 579.
109 Id.
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testimony admissibility after Daubert: General Electric Co. v. Joiner110 and Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael.111  These three cases are collectively referred to as the
“Daubert Trilogy.”  The standards elaborated in this trilogy of cases placed the
judge in a significantly more active role,112 deciding not only questions of law
regarding expert testimony, but also questions of fact.113
In Daubert, the Supreme Court answered the longstanding question of
whether the Frye standard was still valid for evaluating expert scientific testi-
mony.114  The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence contained the
proper standard, not Frye115—nothing in Rule 702 indicates that Frye’s “gen-
eral acceptance” standard should be the one to govern.116  The Supreme
Court declared that judges should act as “gatekeepers” for expert testimony
in determining that their methods were not only relevant, but also relia-
ble.117  The Court specifically stated that “the Rules of Evidence—especially
Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand.”118  Rule 702, however, originally said nothing about the judge—
rather than the jury—being the responsible fact-finder.119
The committee’s note on the year 2000 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence report that “in Daubert the Court charged trial judges with
the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers”;120 however, the Federal Rules of
Evidence themselves did not provide this specific command.121  In fact, some
scholars note that the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves appear to com-
mit the jury to the determination of scientific validity, but policy considera-
tions have favored the judge making such determination instead.122
Federal Rule of Evidence 104 does assign the court the task of deciding
any preliminary questions on whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists,
or evidence is admissible.123  Expert evidence is not necessarily a preliminary
question and is not the type that the court must decide in the absence of the
110 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
111 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
112 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (noting the more active gatekeeping role for judges).
113 See David M. Malone & Paul J. Zwier, Epistemology after Daubert, Kumho Tire, and the
New Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (2001) (arguing that the
reliability of methodology presents questions of fact, not questions of law).
114 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–90.
115 Id. at 579.
116 Id. at 588.
117 Id. at 597.
118 Id. (emphasis added).
119 See generally An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceed-
ings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975); FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended 2000).
120 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
121 See Imwinkelried, supra note 90, at 616 (arguing that Federal Rules of Evidence
104(b) and 901(b)(9) appear to commit the jury to the determination of scientific validity
but policy considerations favor the judge making this determination).
122 See id.
123 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”).
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jury.  Rule 104(c) specifies guidelines for when the court must conduct a
preliminary hearing apart from the jury.  The types of preliminary questions
for the judge to decide without a jury are: (1) if the admissibility of a confes-
sion is involved; (2) if a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and so
requests; or (3) if justice so requires.124  The argument that “justice so
requires” a judge, and not the jury, to decide expert testimony questions
lacks support.125
Nevertheless, having assigned to judges this task of assessing expert testi-
mony admissibility, Daubert provides them with guidelines.126  Factors for
judges to consider in this evaluation include if there is a known error rate,127
if the theory has or can be tested,128 if the method was subject to peer review
or publication,129 and if the method has achieved widespread acceptance in
the field.130  The Court stated that this does not establish a definitive check-
list, but should be a flexible standard.131  Discretion resides with judges as to
whether the proponent of the evidence has met this standard.132
In addition to empowering judges to decide important factual questions,
the Supreme Court gave judges’ Daubert rulings great deference upon appel-
late review.  In 1997, the Supreme Court decided General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,133 holding that “abuse of discretion” is the proper standard to apply
when reviewing the district court’s evidentiary rulings.134  The Court stated
that a district court’s evidentiary ruling should not be reversed unless it is
“manifestly erroneous.”135  Such a deferential standard has led to a high
affirmance rate on appellate review.136  The practical implication of this stan-
dard is that judges can effectively decide a case by ruling on the admissibility
of expert testimony alone.  The case of Valente v. Textron, Inc.137 discussed at
the beginning of this Note is illustrative.138
124 FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
125 See Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really Different?, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14 (2013) (discussing a substantial body of research that casts
doubt on the claim that jurors overvalue expert testimony).
126 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993).
127 Id. at 594.
128 Id. at 593.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 594.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no
matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations.”).
133 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
134 Id. at 146.
135 Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
136 See Robert Robinson, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and the Local Con-
struction of Reliability, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39, 63 (2009).
137 931 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting the defense’s motion for summary
judgment after the judge excluded the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony as a result of a Daubert
hearing).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 2–11.
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In 1999, the Supreme Court expanded trial judges’ authority further.  In
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,139 the Court held that the Daubert standard
applies to expert testimony based on technical or other specialized knowl-
edge, not simply expert scientific testimony.140  Therefore, all expert evi-
dence before a federal court must meet the Daubert standard for
admissibility.141
III. CURRENT STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS OF DAUBERT’S
EXPERT EVIDENCE STANDARDS
For expert testimony to be admissible in federal court, the proponent of
the evidence must meet the threshold provided by Federal Rule of Evidence
702.142  Rule 702 requires more than just a determination of the expert’s
qualifications and the reliability of the methods the expert used.  In addition
to laying a foundation that the expert has the requisite skill, knowledge, edu-
cation, experience, or training, the proponent must demonstrate that the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.143  Some courts consider juries competent to decide whether the pro-
ponent of expert testimony has satisfied the final prong of Rule 702.144
The line and reasoning dividing the questions of fact that the judge
decides (reliability) from those that the jury may decide (whether the meth-
ods were applied reliably to the facts of the case) appears an arbitrary distinc-
tion.  The committee’s note for the year 2000 amendments to Rule 702
recognized the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert.145  However, the commit-
tee stated that it was the Court who charged judges with the task of acting as
139 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
140 Id. at 158.
141 See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 27 (noting that “by 2000 all expert testimony needed
to pass a reliability test before it could be deemed admissible”).
142 FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.”).
143 Id.
144 See Betty Layne DesPortes, Jury Instructions on Expert Testimony, BENJAMIN &
DESPORTES 2, http://benjamindesportes.com/pdfs/Jury_Instructions.pdf (last visited Oct.
27, 2014) (providing instructions to the jury to evaluate whether the expert applied reliably
the methods to the facts); see also Symposium, The Restyled Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1435, 1507–09 (2012) [hereinafter The Restyled Rules] (some scholars argue
that the final prong of Rule 702 poses a credibility question that should be determined by
the jury).
145 In addition to the year 2000 amendments, the Federal Rules of Evidence were “re-
stylized” in 2012, but no substantive changes were made.  For further discussion on the
reasoning behind the amendments and the re-stylized Federal Rules of Evidence, see The
Restyled Rules, supra note 144.
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gatekeepers.146  Furthermore, the committee notes emphasize that the
Daubert precedent is not supposed to replace the traditional role of the
jury—nor is it “intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to
the testimony of every expert.”147  The committee reviewed relevant caselaw
and noted that “the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather
than the rule.”148  The committee quoted federal precedent stating that “the
trial court’s role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for
the adversary system.”149  Yet, evidence demonstrates that Daubert and its
progeny have done just that.150
Daubert and its progeny have resulted in a significant increase in prelimi-
nary evidentiary hearings on expert evidence with the jury having no role in
the decisionmaking process.151  The change in standards shifting the power
from juries to judges acting as “gatekeepers” has caused fewer cases to go to
trial and has diminished the right to a trial by jury.152
Some states, recognizing the threat presented by Daubert, allow for lib-
eral admissibility of expert opinions.153  These efforts aim to ensure that the
testimony of qualified experts is not kept from the jury due to a judge’s opin-
ion of that testimony.154
146 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.
1996)).
150 See Flores et al., supra note 89, at 561–63 (noting the empirical implications of
Daubert resulting in a decrease of trials and increase in preliminary evidentiary hearings on
expert evidence); see also Mara Hatfield, Putting Daubert In Proper Perspective, LAW360 (Aug.
01, 2013) http://www.law360.com/articles/460776/putting-daubert-in-proper-perspective
(“While the role of gatekeeper was set up to eliminate reliance on a bright-line rule requir-
ing general acceptance, the defense bar has turned the role into a chance to convince a
judge that a certain study is unreliable merely because it is contradicted.”).
151 See Flores et al., supra note 89, at 561–63 (noting the empirical implications of
Daubert resulting in a decrease of trials and increase in preliminary evidentiary hearings on
expert evidence).
152 See Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U.
PITT. L. REV. 281, 291–92 (2007) (discussing how Daubert undermines the Seventh
Amendment).
153 For example, in North Dakota, the expert’s qualification is a matter for the trial
court’s discretion—but the judge has no discretion to determine the strength of the testi-
mony and generally allows the expert’s testimony to be admitted into evidence. See, e.g.,
Myer v. Rygg, 630 N.W.2d 62, 69 (N.D. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily weakness in an expert’s opin-
ion affects credibility, not admissibility.  The trial court decides the qualifications of the
witness to express an opinion on a given topic, but it is the trier of fact whose job it is to
decide the expert witness’s credibility and the weight to be given to the testimony.” (cita-
tion omitted)); see also The Restyled Rules, supra note 144, at 1508 & n.86 (discussing amend-
ments to Arizona’s rules of evidence and recognizing the overemphasis on the judge’s role
as a gatekeeper).
154 See The Restyled Rules, supra note 144, at 1508 (“[W]e think there’s been some over-
emphasis on this notion of gatekeeping, of keeping away from the jury an expert fully
qualified just because [the judge] think[s] [the expert’s] opinion is not a good one.”).
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A. Empirical Implications
The Valente case discussed above155 is the quintessential example of
Daubert’s effects.  Like Valente, many cases are kept from reaching a jury
because of a judge’s evidence determination at a pretrial hearing.156  An
empirical study of the effects of the Daubert trilogy indicates a statistically
significant increase in the number of preliminary evidentiary challenges.157
Research also indicates that the basis for such challenges changed after
Daubert.158  Pre-Daubert challenges were primarily based on procedural
grounds such as failing to designate an expert.159  Post-Daubert challenges are
primarily based on the substantive grounds of the expert’s evidence, requir-
ing the adjudication of a crucial component of the case before the trial.160
B. Jurisprudential Implications of the Daubert Trilogy
1. Who Is More Competent to Decide: Judge or Jury?
The Daubert standard assumes that judges are more competent than
juries to make decisions on the reliability of expert testimony.161 Daubert
specifically charges judges to act as “gatekeepers” to keep this type of evi-
dence away from the jury.162  The Daubert “gatekeeping” command to judges
is partially based on the fear that juries will give too much weight to incredi-
ble or unreliable expert testimony.163  But when it comes to assessing the
reliability of methods that the expert employed—why does the Court assume
judges are better suited to answer this question than juries?
Judges typically answer questions of law while juries answer questions of
fact.164  This stems from a general acknowledgement that judges are more
competent in the law than juries given their legal experience.165  However,
the reliability of an expert’s methods (in themselves or their application to
155 See supra text accompanying notes 2–11.
156 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 87.




161 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“We are confi-
dent that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”).
162 Id. at 597.
163 See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125, at 13–14 (“The concern is that non-expert
triers of fact will consistently overvalue expert testimony beyond its intrinsic epistemic
worth.”).
164 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 89 (1895) (noting that judges decide
questions of law while juries decide questions of fact).
165 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 98–100 (allowing juries to decide questions of
law would usurp the powers of the court).
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the case) is a question of fact, not a question of law.166  Fact questions are
traditionally left to the jury to decide.167
In a 2001 survey of several hundred state court judges, approximately
half of them admitted that they were not adequately prepared to evaluate the
range of scientific evidence proffered in their courtrooms.168  Additionally,
almost every judge failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of half of
Daubert’s criteria.169  On a federal level, inexperienced judges are more likely
to dismiss a case after a Daubert hearing to avoid a trial so their weaknesses as
trial judges will not be exposed.170
A case that calls for an expert witness does so because it requires special-
ized knowledge in that particular field.171  Unless a judge coincidentally has
expertise in that field, they are likely no better qualified than a jury to assess
such questions if Rule 702’s own standard for qualifications was applied to
determine who should decide.172  Additionally, since Kumho expanded
Daubert’s requirements to govern more than just “scientific” testimony, but
also technical or other specialized knowledge,173 the rule assumes that
judges are more qualified than juries to assess practically any evidence in any
field that requires advanced knowledge.
The likely purpose of Daubert was that the Supreme Court wanted to give
district courts more control over their dockets.174  Given the significant
166 See Malone & Zwier, supra note 113, at 118 (arguing that the reliability of methodol-
ogy presents questions of fact, not questions of law).
167 See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 89 (noting that juries decide questions of fact); cf. Daubert, 509
U.S. at 600–01 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not doubt
that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions
of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony.  But I do not think it imposes on them
either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform
that role.”).
168 Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001).
169 Id. at 452.
170 See Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 300–02 (“Some district judges are appointed
without sufficient consideration of the adequacy of their civil trial experience.  Without a
minimum of trial experience, many judges seek to avoid trials.  In addition, they risk devel-
oping biases in the handling of cases that play to their strengths and avoid their weak-
nesses. . . . Judges without academic or trial experience are going to avoid jury trials at all
costs (and defer to the trial court’s Daubert assessment at the appeals level) so as not to
reveal their weaknesses.”).
171 See FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (“[T]he expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.”).
172 See id. (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion . . . .” (emphasis added)).
173 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
174 See Faigman, supra note 92, at 909–10 (“The more likely purpose for Daubert and its
progeny is more pedestrian. . . . [The Daubert revolution] was meant to serve a greater
agenda than simply an evidentiary one.  It was meant to serve the managerial power of trial
courts to control their dockets.”); see also Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 299 (noting
that judges have a strong incentive to dispose of cases through a Daubert hearing in order
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decrease in trials since Daubert,175 it seems the Court achieved this goal—
though at a cost.  The jury’s fact-finding role on critical questions substan-
tially diminished.  This is not the requirement or purpose of Rule 702.176
Daubert and its progeny changed the adversarial system by reducing the right
to trial by jury.177
2. Who Should Have the Power to Decide: Judge or Jury?
America was founded on the principles of popular sovereignty.178  Popu-
lar sovereignty is the idea that rather than having one individual ruler or
monarch, the people have the authority and are the “sovereign.”179  The gov-
ernment gets their authority through the people’s consent which is mani-
fested through the election process.180
The selection of judges presents a unique situation for the idea of popu-
lar sovereignty.  Federal judges are nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate.181  The selection of state judges, however, varies.  Some
states have an election process while others have an appointment process.182
The dilemma of who decides a case is critical because whoever has the
decisionmaking power is essentially in the role of a “sovereign.”183  The right
to a trial by jury is a fundamental right in our nation to ensure that the power
to manage their dockets); cf. Hatfield, supra note 150 (“While the role of gatekeeper was set up
to eliminate reliance on a bright-line rule requiring general acceptance, the defense bar has turned
the role into a chance to convince a judge that a certain study is unreliable merely because
it is contradicted.” (emphasis added)).
175 Refo, supra note 19, at 2.
176 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. 14.38 Acres
of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the judge’s role as a “gatekeeper”
was not intended to replace the adversary system).
177 See Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 315 (“Daubert has severely crippled the plain-
tiff’s right to a jury trial and has had an effect opposite of that which the Supreme Court
intended.”).
178 See Lash, supra note 55, at 1938–50.
179 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 7 (noting that one of the first principles of
American jurisprudence is that the people are sovereign); MORGAN, supra note 55, at
235–88 (discussing concept of popular sovereignty in American jurisprudence); Dawson,
supra note 55, at 282–84 (discussing the history and exercise of popular sovereignty in
America); Lash, supra note 55, at 1910 (same).
180 See Lash, supra note 55, at 1938–50.
181 U.S. CONST. art. III.
182 Compare Orrin W. Johnson & Laura Johnson Urbis, Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gath-
ering Storm?, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 525, 539 (1992) (discussing ethical dilemma inherent in
Texas’s election process), with Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas: A Compar-
ison of Systems, 69 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 32 (2000) (discussing the bifurcated judicial selection
system in Kansas where supreme court and court of appeals judges are selected through a
nonpartisan commission system, and district court judges are selected by either a nonparti-
san commission system or partisan election).
183 See Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 790
(2005).
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is in the people and to safeguard against tyranny.184  Although many can
agree that some cases might be better suited for a judge instead of a jury,185
small encroachments upon the jury’s power to decide have vast implications
for the outcome of the trial as well as if the jury will have any decisionmaking
power at all.  James Madison forewarned us about the dangers of minor
infringements of the people’s power when he said, “there are more instances
of the abridgement of the freedom of the people, by gradual and silent
encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations.”186
Taking away the jury’s decisionmaking power regarding expert testimony is
an example of a gradual and silent encroachment that Madison feared.
Some have argued that judges should decide expert testimony reliability
instead of juries because juries are more likely to overvalue expert testimony
even if it is unreliable.187  Therefore, the alleged purpose is to promote jus-
tice by keeping from the jury unreliable evidence that could influence their
decision.  Empirical research suggests that these claims about jury overvalua-
tion of expert testimony are doubtful.188
A study conducted by the American Bar Association found no unfair
influence on jury’s decisionmaking due to expert testimony.189  Other stud-
ies suggest that claims of juries’ susceptibility to undue influence by expert
testimony are unfounded.190
Perhaps there was a different reason why the Supreme Court assigned
judges rather than juries this factfinding authority.  The Court may have
wanted to give judges an effective means to dispose of frivolous lawsuits.191
By conducting a pretrial hearing on crucial evidence admissibility, a trial
judge may control whether a case proceeds forward.192  Although court man-
agement and efficiency are legitimate concerns, they do not justify manipu-
lating interpretations of evidence rules or reconstruction of the traditional
province of the jury.  The Daubert revolution undermines the Seventh
184 See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 875 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2013)
(discussing the history and purpose of the right to a trial by jury).
185 Such cases are ones that typically require additional expertise such as patent, bank-
ruptcy, or tax litigation.
186 James Madison Replies, supra note 1, at 612 (emphasis added).
187 See Imwinkelried, supra note 90, at 616; see also Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125,
at 14 (discussing a substantial body of research that casts doubt on the claim that jurors
overvalue expert testimony).
188 See SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, JURY COMPREHENSION IN
COMPLEX CASES 40–43 (1989).
189 Id.
190 See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125, at 14–16 (discussing a substantial body of
research that casts doubt on the claim that jurors overvalue expert testimony).
191 See Faigman, supra note 92, at 909–10 (“The more likely purpose for Daubert and its
progeny is more pedestrian. . . . [The Daubert revolution] was meant to serve a greater
agenda than simply an evidentiary one.  It was meant to serve the managerial power of trial
courts to control their dockets.”); see also Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 299 (noting
that judges have a strong incentive to dispose of cases through a Daubert hearing in order
to manage their dockets).
192 See Faigman, supra note 92, at 910.
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Amendment193 by allowing judges the discretion and opportunity to prevent
jury trials.194
3. Judicial Activism and Policy-Driven Judges
The framework outlined in Daubert gives great discretion to the district
court judge.195  The Court in Daubert maintained that there was not a defini-
tive checklist of requirements for satisfying the reliability standard to admit
expert testimony.196  Rather, the inquiry into reliability of an expert’s meth-
ods is a flexible one.197  The standard of review for the appellate court of a
district court’s Daubert ruling is an abuse of discretion standard.198  Such a
highly deferential standard of review means that the likelihood of an appel-
late court reversing the district court’s decision is small.199  Research indi-
cates the affirmance rate for Daubert hearings is approximately ninety
percent.200  Given these circumstances, careful judges can be fairly certain
that their Daubert rulings will not be overturned.  Such deference gives trial
judges more opportunity to insert their policy opinions into their decisions.
The judicial autonomy allowed under Daubert also permits wide varia-
tions among judges interpreting and implementing its principle in different
contexts.201  Such wide discretion given to judges from Daubert allows courts
to develop localized understandings of admissibility.202  This judicial auton-
omy allows policy considerations to influence judges.  Instead, judges should
use clear and impartial rules of admissibility.  On the other hand, some fed-
eral judges who disagree with the Daubert revolution have simply refused to
193 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.”), with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge,
no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of
authentic insights and innovations.”), and Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 291–92 (dis-
cussing how Daubert undermines the Seventh Amendment).
194 See Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 291–92, 299.
195 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–43 (1997) (holding that a trial
court judge has broad discretion in admitting or excluding testimony); Watkins v. Tel-
smith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that district courts enjoy wide lati-
tude in determining the admissibility of expert testimony); Harvey Brown, Procedural Issues
Under Daubert, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1133, 1158 (1999) (noting that trial judges have broad
discretion regarding expert testimony).
196 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
197 Id. at 594.
198 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.
199 See Gagnon v. Teledyne Princeton, Inc., 437 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 2006) (describ-
ing the abuse of discretion standard as “highly deferential” (quoting Delany v. Matesanz,
264 F.3d 7, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2001)).
200 See Robinson, supra note 136, at 63.
201 See id. at 64.
202 See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 28 (discussing judicial resistance to the new stan-
dards of expert testimony by lower courts).
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apply the new standards.203  This behavior from judges also results in incon-
sistent standards of admissibility among the lower courts.204
Recent studies on judicial behavior suggest that judges attempt to
advance a variety of goals, ranging from enhancing their policy preferences
to adhering to precedent.205  The true motivation of a judge’s opinion is
difficult to discern.  Allowing judges too much discretion will empower them
to act on policy considerations in areas where it may be inappropriate.
With the increase in scientific and technological innovations affecting
innumerable areas of contemporary life, experts are playing a crucial role in
much litigation.  Judges deciding the reliability and validity of expert meth-
ods are in control of substantial numbers of cases, and opportunities for
value judgments abound.  For instance, in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dis-
trict,206 parents brought a suit against a school challenging the constitutional-
ity of the school’s policy on teaching intelligent design in a biology class.207
The court held that the policy was a violation of the Establishment Clause by
endorsing religion208 and that intelligent design theory was not a science.209
The judge used the Daubert factors to make a policy judgment about intelli-
gent design.210  Additionally, judges may be required to answer questions on
reliability of expert testimony over controversial topics such as stem-cell
research, cloning, birth control,211 or abortion.212  The judge’s determina-
tion of the expert’s testimony over these controversial topics allows them to
make policy judgments on the underlying subject matter.213
The Supreme Court’s instruction that the Daubert standard should be a
flexible inquiry is proper.214  The problem is that this flexible inquiry is only
allowed by the judge, not the jury.215  Therefore, judges are permitted to
203 Id. at 29.
204 Id. at 69 (“The Supreme Court could step in . . . to reign in wayward circuits.
But . . . has allowed lower court judges significant latitude to ignore Rule 702.”).
205 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 15–16 (1997); Robinson,
supra note 136, at 75.
206 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
207 Id. at 707–11.
208 Id. at 765.
209 Id. at 743–46.
210 See Megan Dillhoff, Note, Science, Law, and Truth: Defining the Scope of the Daubert
Trilogy, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1289, 1316–17 (2011) (arguing that the judge overstepped
his bounds when he decided that intelligent design was not a science when the case did not
require him to make such a decision).
211 See Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
212 See Hill v. Mills, 26 So. 3d 322, 325 (Miss. 2010).
213 In another similar example, a Michigan judge excluded an Ivy League law student
as an expert witness from a trial regarding a gay marriage ban. Michigan’s Witness in Gay
Marriage Trial Barred, MYFOXDETROIT.COM (Mar. 03, 2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.myfoxde
troit.com/story/24867957/michigans-witnesses-next-in-gay-marriage-trial.
214 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
215 See id. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no
matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations.”).
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insert policy considerations into their rulings.  Since questions of expert testi-
mony are primarily questions of fact, they are within the purview of jury deci-
sionmaking.216  This recent change, requiring judges to answer questions of
fact, encroaches upon the rights of the jury, affects the ultimate outcome of
the case, and allows for more judicial activism.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE THE FLAWS OF DAUBERT’S PROGENY
A. Juries, Not Judges, Should Be the “Gatekeepers”
The guidelines for laying the foundation of expert testimony outlined in
Daubert should remain—but juries, not judges, should be the “gatekeepers.”
After juries play this “gatekeeping” role, they can then proceed to deciding
the ultimate issue in the case and whether to take the expert testimony into
consideration.  If the judge acts as a gatekeeper to expert evidence, and
allows the evidence in, then by the time the evidence gets to the jury it
already has the judge’s stamp of approval.217  This could make it more likely
that any expert evidence that gets in will be given the benefit of the doubt.218
Instead, the jury should critically analyze and scrutinize the evidence.219  On
the other hand, if the judge excludes the expert evidence, then a trial is
unlikely to occur at all, and will instead be disposed of through summary
judgment.220
Having juries act as gatekeepers may also keep judges from overex-
tending their judicial power, as Chief Justice Rehnquist feared would happen
as a result of Daubert.221  Rehnquist dissented in part in Daubert, warning that
this new standard for judges may enable them to overextend the reach of
their power.222  He advised that judges should “proceed with great caution in
deciding more than we have to, because our reach can so easily exceed our
grasp.”223  The Chief Justice’s fears in Daubert are now a reality.  The frame-
work proposed in this Note aims to properly cabin the judicial role to its
traditional form: judges decide questions of law regarding expert testimony,
and juries decide questions of fact.
216 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 89 (1895) (noting that judges decide
questions of law while juries decide questions of fact).
217 See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact of Judges’ Admis-
sibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 13
(2009) (“When judges allow expert testimony to reach the jury, they are implicitly lending
credence to the testimony, increasing its persuasiveness.”).
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 87.
221 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222 Id. at 598–601.
223 Id. at 599.
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1. Juries Decide Questions of Fact
Since research shows that neither judges nor juries are particularly well-
qualified to decide complex questions regarding expert testimony,224 we
should defer to juries on questions of fact and judges on questions of law.225
This means that juries would decide whether an expert’s methods are reliable
as required by Daubert226 and Rule 702.227  Judges, however, would decide
questions of law regarding expert testimony, such as if enough foundation
was laid to establish the witness’s qualifications as an expert.228
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 104 does assign the court the task of
deciding any preliminary questions about whether a witness is qualified,229
the reliability of expert methods is not a preliminary question that the court
must decide in the absence of the jury.  The circumstances when the court
must conduct a preliminary hearing apart from the jury under Rule 104(c)
are: (1) if it involves the admissibility of a confession; (2) if a defendant in a
criminal case is a witness and so requests; or (3) if justice so requires.230  As
discussed earlier in this Note,231 the argument that “justice so requires”
judges, and not juries, to decide expert testimony questions of fact lacks
support.232
Allowing juries to continue their traditional role of deciding questions of
fact restores the proper balance of authority between judges and juries.  Typi-
cally, the proper balance of authority is found in juries deciding questions of
fact and judges deciding questions of law.233  The Daubert revolution has
224 See Gatowski et al., supra note 168, at 442.
225 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 89 (1895) (noting that judges decide ques-
tions of law while juries decide questions of fact); see also United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d
477, 497–98 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he maxim that fact-finding is for the jury carries consider-
able force.  Leaving too much for the judge to decide would ‘greatly restrict[ ] and in some
cases virtually destroy[ ]’ the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s note)).
226 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (commanding the trial judge to ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but also reliable).
227 FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (requiring expert testimony to be a “product of reliable princi-
ples and methods”).
228 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified.”); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10) (noting that the proponent of expert
evidence must satisfy the preponderance of the evidence threshold).
229 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”).
230 FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
231 See supra Section II.C.
232 See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125, at 14 (discussing a substantial body of
research that casts doubt on the claim that jurors overvalue expert testimony).
233 Compare Harrington, supra note 85, at 401–02 (discussing the development of the
fact-finding function of the jury), with Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 183 (1895) (Gray
& Shiras, JJ., dissenting) (juries should decide every question of fact, but are prohibited
from deciding questions of law), and AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 98–100 (allowing
juries to decide questions of law would usurp the powers of the court); see also FED. R. EVID.
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usurped the power of juries by taking away their fact-finding function.234
The standards for expert evidence admissibility should return to our legal
system’s traditional role of juries acting as fact-finders.235
2. Jury Instructions
Since judges have been charged with this “gatekeeping” function for
over two decades, some courts may resist the method presented in this Note,
since juries may not properly understand the Daubert factors.236  Nonethe-
less, jury instructions can easily ameliorate this concern.
Many jurisdictions vary on the type of instructions appropriate for expert
evidence.237  Given that Daubert resulted in varied and localized standards of
admissibility,238 this lack of uniformity is not surprising.  Furthermore, when
expert testimony has a high propensity to mislead the jury, some courts give
juries limiting instructions on how to evaluate the evidence.239  Such a solu-
tion would also work with analyzing reliability under the Daubert factors.
Judges can instruct juries to consider the Daubert factors when evaluating
the reliability of the expert’s methods.  Many courts already adopt this
approach for preliminary questions regarding other forms of evidence.  For
example, some courts allow juries to decide preliminary questions of fact for
hearsay evidence regarding co-conspirators’ declarations.240  Other courts
allow juries to hear dying declarations, with instructions to consider the pre-
liminary question of whether the declarant had a reasonable expectation of
death, as required to be admitted as a hearsay exception.241
104 advisory committee’s note (“If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were
determined solely by the judge, as provided in subdivision (a), the functioning of the jury
as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed.”).
234 See Harrington, supra note 85, at 401–02 (discussing the development of the fact-
finding function of the jury).
235 See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 183 (defendants have a “right to have the jury decide every
matter of fact involved in that issue” (emphasis added)); Malone & Zwier, supra note 113,
at 118–19 (arguing that the reliability of methodology presents questions of fact, not ques-
tions of law); Wright & Williams, supra note 76, at 472 (fact-finding is still exclusively within
the jury’s purview).
236 See generally Bernstein, supra note 29, at 28 (discussing judicial resistance to the new
standards of expert testimony by lower courts).
237 See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., 1A FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14:01
(6th ed. 2014).
238 See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 28 (discussing how judges apply varied standards of
admissibility regarding expert testimony).
239 See United States v. Rodebaugh, 561 F.3d 864, 868–69 (8th Cir. 2009) (ruling that
the admission of expert evidence did not warrant reversal since the jury was not substan-
tially impacted since the judge gave the jury a limiting instruction on how to evaluate
expert testimony).
240 See United States v. Monaco, 702 F.2d 860, 878 (11th Cir. 1983).
241 See Conway v. State, 171 So. 16, 17 (Miss. 1936); State v. Dotson, 123 S.E. 463,
463–64 (W. Va. 1924).
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Jury instructions are also used for preliminary questions regarding
authentication,242 relevance,243 and lay opinion testimony.244  Some scholars
have argued that expert opinion evidence is not substantially different from
lay opinion evidence to warrant differential treatment.245  As such, judges
should instruct juries on how to evaluate expert evidence, similar to how
judges instruct juries on preliminary questions involving other forms of evi-
dence.  With this method, judges would act more as “guides” to expert testi-
mony than “gatekeepers” by ensuring that juries critically evaluate any expert
evidence heard in court.
B. Alternative Solution: The Clear and Convincing Standard
The rules of evidence present a higher standard for admission of expert
testimony than other forms of evidence.246  Although admission of expert
testimony has additional requirements, the proponent of the evidence must
meet his or her burden of proof by the same preponderance of the evidence
threshold as most other forms of evidence.247  The preponderance of the
evidence threshold is the lowest burden, where the proponent simply has to
meet the “more likely than not” standard.248  On the other hand, some
courts hold that other forms of evidence that have a high propensity for mis-
use or misapplication should be governed by the higher “clear and convinc-
242 See United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 640 (2d Cir. 1979)
(instructing the jury that it must judge worth of testimony of witness in determining if tape
was authentic); United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the
jury was properly instructed on authentication issue that the government had to prove that
the voice on the tape was the defendant’s).
243 See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining that the
jury decides preliminary questions as to conditional relevancy of evidence).
244 See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1009 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district
court instructed the jury that the agents were not expert witnesses and that the jurors
should independently determine the meaning of the statements.”).
245 See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125, at 11–26.
246 See Brief of the American Medical Association, American Medical Association/Spe-
cialty Society Medical Liability Project et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102) (“While the lower
courts have universally agreed that expert scientific testimony must satisfy a higher thresh-
old standard than mere relevance, they differ in defining that higher standard of
admissibility.”).
247 See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The bur-
den of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the
party offering the expert, and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.” (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10)); cf. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125, at
10 (noting that the higher threshold for scientific and expert evidence presupposes that it
is even more flawed than direct evidence).
248 See Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Brisco Enters. (In re Briscoe Enters.), 994
F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The two options are proof by a preponderance of the
evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.  ‘Preponderance’ means that it is more
likely than not.  ‘Clear and convincing’ is a higher standard and requires a high probability
of success.”).
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ing” threshold for admissibility.249  Courts often apply the higher clear and
convincing threshold for admissibility to character evidence, given the preju-
dicial effect it may have on the trier of fact.250
The desire to have experts satisfy a higher standard with additional
requirements is justified in a culture of class actions251 and mass tort litiga-
tion when their testimony may have a strong impact on society.  However,
diminishing the jury’s decisional authority is an infringement upon a vener-
able institution with profound implications for self-governance.  A trial
court’s gatekeeping duty requires that the proponent of the expert witness
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that its expert’s opinions are both
relevant and reliable.252  This standard applies to both pretrial Daubert hear-
ings253 as well as expert testimony offered during trial.254
Conducting a voir dire of the witness at the time of trial255 would be
more appropriate than a Daubert hearing prior to trial.  This way, the out-
come of the entire trial is not as dependent upon the judge’s evaluation of
the expert testimony.  Furthermore, a plaintiff will then get to present at least
some evidence to a jury.  However, given that courts may be hesitant to ini-
tially give back to juries their original fact-finding authority for expert testi-
mony,256 a more practical approach may be to require the pretrial Daubert
249 See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1344 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that
“there must be clear and convincing evidence of the [character evidence] to justify its
admissibility”).
250 See id. at 1343; see also Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 589 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1979)
(noting a principle purpose behind the exclusion of character evidence is the prejudicial
effect that it can have on the trier of fact).
251 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 913 (1998) (describing class actions as the most dramatic change in civil proce-
dure over the past couple decades).
252 See FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Friend v. Time Mfg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1080
(D. Ariz. 2005) (noting the trial court’s gatekeeping duties include evaluating whether
expert testimony is relevant and reliable under the preponderance of the evidence
threshold).
253 See Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Disclosure of Intent to Use Expert Testi-
mony, Facts and Data Underlying Expert’s Opinion and Request to Disallow Such Expert
at Trial or Allow a Daubert/Kumho Hearing as to the Alleged Expert at 4, United States v.
Williams, No. 3:05-CR-260-SLB-TMP (N.D. Ala. 2005), 2005 WL 6410893 (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 507 U.S. 509 (1993)).
254 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (noting the prepon-
derance of the evidence threshold for admissibility determinations that hinge on primarily
factual questions); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 144 (3rd Cir. 2000) (proponent
of expert testimony must satisfy preponderance of the evidence threshold); Squires v.
Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048 (D. Colo. 2011) (“The proponent of expert testi-
mony has the burden of establishing the admissibility of the expert’s opinions under Rule
702 by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
255 See Navarro v. Soaring Helmet Corp., 429 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2011) (exclud-
ing expert testimony after voir dire on the third day of trial).
256 See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 28 (discussing judicial resistance to the new stan-
dards of expert testimony by lower courts).
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challenger to carry the burden instead, and to meet a higher clear and con-
vincing threshold that the expert’s methods are unreliable.
The benefit of this approach is two-fold: (1) judges will have less discre-
tion to implement policy judgments, and (2) litigants will be less likely to
abuse the Daubert challenge.  The current preponderance of the evidence
standard for Daubert challenges257 allows for significant judicial discretion.258
Furthermore, the appellate standard of review for a district court’s Daubert
ruling is an abuse of discretion standard.259  Such a deferential standard
means that the likelihood of appellate court reversal of judges’ decisions is
small.260  Therefore, judges are granted significant discretion with abundant
opportunities to insert their policy preferences in their opinions, since they
can be fairly certain that their Daubert rulings will not be overturned.  Requir-
ing this higher clear and convincing standard for pretrial Daubert challengers
may help minimize a judge’s discretion in his or her Daubert rulings,261 thus
restricting judicial activism and policymaking.
Furthermore, with the higher standard proposed in this Note, litigants
will be less likely to abuse Daubert motions unless there is good cause to chal-
lenge the expert testimony.  In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,262 the Court
noted that trial judges should avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings and
require appropriate proceedings where “cause” arises.263  However, the prac-
tical effects of Daubert have run far beyond what the Court intended or what
Rule 702 requires.  Pretrial challenges to expert evidence have increased sub-
stantially since Daubert.264  This has in turn resulted in a significant decrease
257 See, e.g., Moore v. Napolitano, 926 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating that the
proponent of expert evidence bears the burden to prove that the expert is reliable by a
preponderance of the evidence); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp.
1490, 1497 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (noting that the proponent “must establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that their expert testimony meets the Daubert standards of scientific
reliability”).
258 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–43 (1997) (holding that a trial
court judge has broad discretion in admitting or excluding testimony); Watkins v. Tel-
smith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that district courts enjoy wide lati-
tude in determining the admissibility of expert testimony); Brown, supra note 196, at 1158
(noting trial judges have broad discretion regarding expert testimony).
259 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139.
260 See Gagnon v. Teledyne Princeton, Inc., 437 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 2006) (describ-
ing the abuse of discretion standard as “highly deferential” (quoting Delany v. Matesanz,
264 F.3d 7, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2001)).
261 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d
813, 820–21 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), that Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56(f) expressly grants the trial judge broad discretion to order discovery prior to
summary judgment which would be stripped from the judge if the party had to meet the
“clear and convincing” threshold.
262 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
263 Id. at 152.
264 See Flores et al., supra note 89, at 563 (noting the empirical implications of Daubert
resulting in an increase in preliminary evidentiary hearings on expert evidence).
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in trials.265  Yet, the committee’s note to Rule 702 clarifies that the intent of
Daubert was not to provide an automatic challenge to all expert testimony.266
The current standard of expert admissibility allows judges to dispose of
cases too easily after a Daubert hearing.  Taking away juries’ authority and
giving it to judges allows judges the opportunity to prevent jury trials, thus
undermining the Seventh Amendment and infringing on the rights of the
jury.267  Requiring pretrial Daubert challengers to meet a higher standard will
at least be a step in the right direction.
C. Criticism and Concerns with This Framework
Although the framework proposed in this Note provides for restoration
of responsibilities for judges and juries, there are still concerns that should
be addressed.  First, this framework may result in a less “efficient” docket
than Daubert’s criteria would yield.  When court dockets are densely popu-
lated, cases may be disposed of on the merits without a Daubert hearing.  In
fact, many courts have stated that judges do not need to conduct a Daubert
hearing, and the expert evidence may be excluded if the record is already
well established.268  Additionally, there are other ways to dispose of a case
when it lacks merit without having the judge infringe upon the jury’s
authority.
Summary judgment is one way cases are often disposed of without a trial.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”269  Reliability of expert testimony is a material fact that should require
the jury to answer the questions it raises.270  This framework still allows for
the court to be efficient in its caseload management while not encroaching
on the jury’s role.
Another criticism of this approach is that juries may not be competent to
decide questions of fact regarding expert testimony, and may give improper
weight to unreliable expert testimony.271  As mentioned above, the same
worry attends to judges.272  Moreover, the claims of juror overvaluation of
265 See Refo, supra note 19, at 2.
266 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
267 See Kanner & Casey, supra note 152, at 291–92 (discussing how Daubert undermines
the Seventh Amendment).
268 See, e.g., Miller v. Baker Implement Co., 439 F.3d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding
that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s expert testimony
without a Daubert hearing).
269 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
270 See Malone & Zwier, supra note 113, at 118–19 (arguing that the reliability of meth-
odology presents questions of fact, not questions of law).
271 See Imwinkelried, supra note 90, at 616 (arguing the policy favors that judges mak-
ing the determination of validity of scientific testimony because jurors may not understand
it and are unlikely to disregard unreliable evidence during deliberations).
272 See Gatowski et al., supra note 168, at 442.
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expert testimony are unsupported.273  If judges are no better equipped for
the task than juries, reassigning the responsibility from juries to judges is
further unjustified.
Even if neither judges nor juries are deemed perfectly equipped for the
task of deciding these questions, it is not clear that there are preferable alter-
natives.  Perhaps expert testimony could be weighed by a panel of experts in
the relevant field.  However, the costs, time, and complexity presented by this
alterative would be substantial.  And adding yet more experts only rein-
troduces questions of qualification and method that would—once again—
need court supervision and adjudication.
The proper balance is found in the historic assignment of fact questions
to juries and legal questions to judges, even if the subject matter is complex.
CONCLUSION
As this Note has argued, juries, not judges, should be the “gatekeepers”
of expert evidence.  This would restore the balance of power between them.
However, the recommended factors for laying foundation for reliability in
Daubert should still remain.  Juries should make the ultimate decision on reli-
ability, since this primarily entails questions of fact.  This framework will also
prevent judges from inserting their policy-based opinions into their Daubert
rulings.  As a result, cases will be more likely to make it to juries for them to
decide the reliability of expert testimony, as well as the ultimate outcome of
the case.  Many cases, like Valente v. Textron Inc., are frequently being dis-
posed of after Daubert hearings decided solely by judges.
The court’s decision in Valente v. Textron, Inc. to exclude the plaintiff’s
expert testimony might have been appropriate considering the surrounding
factors.274  But whatever the right result, it should have come from the jury.
The problem with Daubert is that it transfers authority from juries to judges.
This transfer of authority encroaches upon the power of the people.
Although this may seem to some only a minor encroachment on the jury’s
decisionmaking power, we must remember James Madison’s warning that
“there are more instances of the abridgement of freedom of the people, by
gradual and silent encroachments by those in power, than by violent and
sudden usurpations.”275
273 See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 125, at 14–16 (discussing a substantial body of
research that casts doubt on the claim that jurors overvalue expert testimony).
274 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 419, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  The expert testified that his conclu-
sions were drawn to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, but the evidence was still
excluded because the court found various factors, such as a known error rate, were miss-
ing. Id.
275 James Madison Replies, supra note 1, at 612.
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